THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
CANADA
FILIPPO SABETTI*

Ut 'ncept'tfidels sic permanett
The British North America Act (BNA Act)' has been "patriated." At last,
Canadians have their own basic law. The historical context of this constitutional
change is the history of a political system that did not work as its creators had
intended, of constitutional reform efforts that ended in stalemate, and of analysts
"fallen into speaking the language of doubt when describing their society."' 2 Why,
then, should we bother about the past? The past is important for three simple
reasons: 1) A large proportion of the reasoning still employed in the analysis of
contemporary government and politics rests explicitly or implicitly on an interpretation of the historical record of constitutional change; past experience could discredit this current reasoning; 2) The modelling and remodelling of constitutional
arrangements are well enough documented to suggest conclusions which could
become plausible working hypotheses about constitutional choice; and 3) The
Constitution of 19823 could be checked against the working hypotheses about past
experiences in order to explain its successful patriation and to predict its applicability for resolving old problems. But the method of the attack of the historical
record will determine the utility of the analysis.
First, the importance of constitutionalism for a liberal democratic society is
well enough established to require no extended elaboration or defense. 4 Laws, regulations, organizations, and property rights-the institutional arrangements in
society that create incentive systems through which citizens and public officials
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D. BELL & L. TEPPERMAN, THE RoOrs OF DIsuNIy, A LOOK AT CANADIAN POLITICAL CUL-

TURE 6 (1979).
3. Constitution Act, 1982.
4. See generally Maddox, A Note on the Meaning of 'Constttlutn" 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 805 (1982);
Sartori, Constitutionalin: A telimnag Discussion, 56 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 853 (1962).
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operate and think politically-are, in the final analysis, established and maintained by constitutional arrangements. These constitutional arrangements determine who may exercise governmental authority, what limits (if any) are placed on
this authority, and the kinds of agreements which must exist between government
decisionmakers before laws, regulations, and organizations are changed. 5 "The
study of politics must, therefore, very largely consist of the examination of the ways
in which constitutional and political institutions, and the social forces and movements in a particular society, interact with each other; of the limits upon the extent
to which stable constitutional modes of behavior can be developed and maintained; of the effects they can have on moulding behavior." 6 By drawing upon the
distinction between individuals engaged in constitutional decisionmaking and
individuals pursuing their relative advantages within institutions, modern public
choice scholars have been able to resolve several paradoxes inherent in collective or
social choices and to provide a better understanding of the strategic opportunities
afforded to future individual decisionmakers by different types of decision rules or
7
decisionmaking structures.
Second, the historical context of the Canadian Constitution of 1982 must be
defined. If the span of time is very long, it is possible to bias the analysis toward
evolutionary and deterministic explanations that are very difficult to confirm or
disprove. Almost all the work on Canadian development before World War II is
plagued with these difficulties.8 If the span of time is very short, it is impossible to
detect trends. It was not too long ago that distinguished students of Canadian
history and politics were dismissing both "provincial rights" as a passing phase in
national development and the Supreme Court as a useful agency for conflict management in federal-provincial relations. Beginning the analysis with the constitutional settlement of 1867, known as Confederation, seems appropriate on at least
two counts. The span of time involved, being neither very long nor very short,
avoids the two extremes. Moreover, Confederation was, all al once, the constitutional change that ended the deadlocked union of 1841 and the status quo that
triggered (or deadlocked) constitutional changes for more than a century.
Third, the object of this article is not simply to explain why, almost since Con5. See, e.g., Kiser & Ostrom, The Three Worlds of Action.- A Metaheoretical Synthesis of Institutional
Approaches, in STRATEGIES OF POLITICAL INQUIRY 179-222 (E. Ostrom ed. 1982); Sproule-Jones, Institutions,
Constitutions and Public Policies.. A Public Choice Over'iew, in CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 38 (M. Atkinson & W. Chandler eds. 1983).
6. M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 314 (1967).
7. See, e.g., J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); V. OSTROM, THE
INTELLECTUAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (2d ed. 1974); Sproule-Jones, Public Choice
Theog , and Natural Resources: A Methodological Explication and Critique, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 790 (1982).
Buchanan and Tullock were able to show that it would be a Pareto-efficient move for individuals at the
constitutional stage to opt for a set of decision rules that does not meet the condition of Pareto efficiency in
taking collective actions. Ostrom has advanced the argument regarding democratic administration as an
alternative to- bureaucratic administration. Sproule-Jones has placed in sharp relief the methodological
criterion of logical consistency for the impetus behind the growth of the public choice paradigm at the
interface of political science, economics, public administration, and law. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971) may be viewed as a more philosophic treatise of this paradigm.
8. See, e.g., C. BERGER, THE WRITING OF CANADIAN HISTORY, ASPECTS OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL
WRITING:

1900-1970 (1976).
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federation, Canadians have been in the midst of some form of constitutional
crisis-what historian Goidwin Smith in 1891 characterized as "the Canadian
question." 9 It is also to evaluate that chain of crises. As Mark Sproule-Jones suggests, "The challenge is not only to explain who wins and who loses, but to develop0
new norms to assess the place of the individual in the organization of the state."'
The principal problem that confronts people in the design and redesign of constitutional arrangements is to determine how values and principles articulated in
correlative forms can be expected to yield different results. The attempts of many
revolutionaries to create new societies and new social orders suggest that it is
entirely possible for fallible human beings to formulate explanations and to use
those explanations for undertaking political and social experiments that do not
work in anticipated ways. The reiteration of unitary and hierarchical principles of
organization led de Tocqueville in his recollections of the 1848 revolt to the conclusion that "in France there is only one thing that we cannot make: a free government; and only one thing that we cannot destroy: centralization."" But this is no
argument for skepticism, merely one against pretensions to omniscience. By disaggregating the problem of social organization between constitutional choice and
governmental decisionmaking, Hobbes was able to anticipate the implications that
this distinction has for the way evaluative analysis is conducted. Hobbes observed
are the
that when constitutional failures occur "the fault is not in men, as they
' 2
matter; but as they are the makers and orderers of [commonwealths]."'
The remainder of the article will proceed as follows. First, the Canadian political tradition and the making of Confederation is discussed. Then, the factors that
led to the remodelling of the 1867 constitutional settlement are traced and
examined. This remodelling suggests three broad phases of constitutional change.
The first phase, beginning in the 1870's and ending in 1927, led to the transformation of provincial governments from glorified municipalities to agents of constitutional choice placed alongside the federal government. The second phase,
beginning in 1927 and ending in the late 1970's, involved efforts by the provincial
and federal governments to determine jointly constitutional arrangements for both
the full patriation of the BNA Act and the provision of public services. The third
phase, beginning in 1980 with the attempt by the federal government to unilaterally patriate the constitution and continuing to date, led to the proclamation of
the new Canadian Constitution in 1982. The first and second phases of constitutional change are assessed. Finally, the significance of the Canadian Constitution
of 1982 for the resolution of old problems and issues while critical features of
Canadian governance remain unchanged is explored.
I
THE CANADIAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND CONFEDERATION

As Frank R. Scott, a leading student in Canadian federalism and for many
9. G. SMITH, CANADA AND THE CANADIAN QUESTION (1891).
10. Sproule-Jones, supra note 5, at 28.
11. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, RECOLLECTIONS xviii (J. Mayer & A. Kerr eds. 1971).
12. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 237 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962)(Ist ed. London 1651).
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years professor of constitutional law at McGill University, suggests, "Like most
political events in which the chief actors profess high aims, Confederation had its
more materialistic aspects."' 13 These ranged from the need to provide a more
secure basis to certain financial and railway interests and the desire to facilitate the
westward expansion of Upper Canada, to the threat to survival engendered by the
vicissitudes of the American Civil War. "Yet even when all allowances necessary
(to take these factors into account) are duly made, the political fact of the 1867
union remains. A new country was created . . .
The terms of the 1867 constitutional settlement combined federal and unitary
principles of organization while the settlement itself was created by a statute of the
imperial parliament, the BNA Act. 15 "[T]he Canadian Constitution at the time of
its creation presented to the world of political science a novel combination of constitutional principles-a monarchical federation based upon legislative supremacy
under a single external sovereign."' 16 It is probably true that without the
Francophone community, the creation of this new country would have proceeded
along centralized lines-in the words of Sir John A. Macdonald, "one government
and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples . . .the cheapest,
the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could [have]
adopt[ed]."'1 7 As Ormsby suggests, "[T]he survival of French Canada, despite the
deliberate attempt to overwhelm it in a union of the two Canadas, demanded the
emergence of a federal concept."' 18
But Confederation was not a sharp break with the history of British North
America since the conquest of New France in 1763. It took place within the
British Empire and the North American Loyalist tradition to the Crown-with a
particular twist. The mixed and balanced nature of parliamentary sovereignty
that was the hallmark of English constitutional tradition and thought did not have
time to emerge as a practice and doctrine in Canada.' 9 The colonial governmental system was replaced in the 1840's by "responsible government," the socalled Westminster model of government. 20 As a result, choices about basic policies and the availability of different organizational arrangements for pursuing new
developmental opportunities continued to reside with members of the executive in
control of the House of Commons. Research for The Developing Canadian Commu13. Scott, PolitcalNatinalism and Confederation, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION: ASPECTS OF CANADIAN LAW AND POLITICS 4 (1977).
14.

Id.

15.
16.

See supra note 1.
Scott, The Development of Canadian Federahsm, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION: ASPECTS OF
CANADIAN LAW AND PoLITics 35 (1971). See also Hodgins, The Plans of Mice and Men, in FEDERALISM IN
CANADA AND AUSTRALIA-THE EARLY YEARS 3, 13 (1978).
17. John A. Macdonald, quoted in THE CONFEDERATION DEBATES IN THE PROVINCES OF CANADA,
1865, THE CARLTON LIBRARY No. 2, at 40 (P. Waite ed. 1963).
18. W. ORMSBY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE FEDERAL CONCEPT IN CANADA, 1839-1845, at 36 (1969);
seeid. at 120-21.

19.

M. VILE, supra note 6, ch. 8.

20. See generally Mallory, Responsive and Responsible Government, 12 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOCIETY OF CANADA, SERIES IV, at 207 (1974); Mallory, ConjAc Management in the Canadian Federal System,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1981, at 231-32.
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nity2 ' led S.D. Clark to conclude that
what has been thought of in Canada as an orderly process of adapting political institutions
to changing circumstances has actually represented an effort to hold in check the kind of
democratic forces which were growing up from within the Canadian community. Responin reaction rather than in response to the true democratic spirit
sible government developed
22
of the Canadian people.

Just as the emergence of the federal concept assured the survival of French
Canada, so the reiteration of responsible government in 1867 assured the continuation of the executive-centered system of government of colonial times.
The fusion of different and antithetical constitutional principles suggests in
part that the Confederation Fathers did not give adequate consideration to the
relationship between the principles and forms used to fashion a united Canada nor
to the consequences that were apt to follow. An examination of some of the fundamental features of the 1867 constitutional settlement suggests why there was little
awareness that the "novel combination of constitutional principles" could give rise
to consequences that radically deviated from expectations.
First, the Canadian constitutional system through sections 40, 90, 91, 92, 93,
95, and 132 of the BNA Act gave the national government formidable power and
influence over provincial governments to place the latter in a colonial subordination to the national government. Why did Upper Canada Fathers of Confederation like George Brown, who were so pro-Upper Canada localism, 23 choose to
support this system of government?
Christopher Armstrong, in his recent book on Ontario's relations with the federal government between 1867 and 1942, suggests possible reasons.2 4 It is true that
Brown spoke for the businessmen of Toronto who saw in a strong central government a prerequisite for economic growth and western expansion, as well as for the
Upper Canada farmers. But Brown was convinced that the strong Ontario representation in the Senate and the House, to which a rising population entitled the

province, and the prospects of sending loyal Reformers to both chambers provided
sufficient safeguards for the vital interests of their locality. Institutions and individuals would see to it that Ontario's local intersts were not neglected. But the
Upper Canada Reformer did not adequately consider that the powers of a prime
minister over his cabinet and party and the convention of collective responsibility
and party solidarity could render Ontario's representation in Parliament almost
nugatory. "As a result, George Brown and his Reform supporters had no qualms
about leading Upper Canadians into a highly centralized union, almost a legisla'25
tive union of the type desired by John A. Macdonald."
Alternatively, "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United
Kingdom" 26 combined with federal arrangements meant, in effect, legislative and
21.
22.
23.

S. CLARK, THE DEVELOPING CANADIAN COMMUNITY (2d ed. 1968).
Id at 208.
See generally Jones, Localism andFederalism in Upper Canadato 1865, in FEDERALISM IN CANADA AND

AUSTRALIA:
24.

THE EARLY YEARS 19 (1978).

See C. ARMSTRONG, THE POLITIcS OF FEDERALISM: ONTARIO'S RELATIONS WITH THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT, 1867-1942 (1981).
25. Id at 12.
26.

BNA Act, supra note 1, preamble.
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administrative supremacy at the provincial as well as the federal level of government. But the powers of the federal government over the provinces served to
obscure and confound the implications of provincial legislative supremacy for
national government dominance. As a result, "no one realized that [this constitution] contained in embryo a principle of the 'co-ordinate sovereignty' of general
and local governments, the inevitable result of which would be sovereign provincial powers and the political cry of 'provincial rights.' "27
Second, though French-speaking communities existed, and were recognized as
such beyond Quebec, French received no written guarantee outside Quebec. The
absence of such guarantee has often been used by most Anglophone analysts to
support the claim that Confederation did not represent the conscious effectuation
of a compact between the English and the French as the two founding peoples of
Canada. Some Anglophone analysts have, however, noted that "[t]he argument
from evidence (or rather from lack of it) that the fathers [of Confederation] made
no open and acknowledged commitment to give legal status to the French language from coast to coast has not and cannot lay to rest the idea of the 'spirit of
Confederation' " as an implied bicultural compact. 28 This implied bicultural
compact received, it is further alleged, confirmation in the 1870 Manitoba Act 29
and the 1875 Act establishing the Northwest Territories. 30 Unfortunately, the
existence of a bicultural compact between the English and the French is difficult to
confirm or disprove. 3 1 Covenantal or providential theology did not even provide
the basis for an emergent English Canadian nationalism. 32 Other, less controversial, factors can be adduced to account for the absence of a written guarantee for
the French outside Quebec. These are: 1) section 93 of the BNA Act, entitling the
national parliament to enact remedial legislation in support of the educational
rights of a provincial denominational minority; 2) at the time "minorities were
more concerned about potential threats to religious rights than to linguistic
34
rights;" '33 and 3) religious rights were then in part perceived as cultural rights.
Third, the BNA Act contained no formula or machinery for its own amendment. The standard explanation is that by the 1860's the British Parliament "still
regarded itself as the supreme constituent power in the British Empire, and it
would not lightly have been persuaded to grant a wholly Canadian procedure of
27.

W. MORTON, THE CRITICAL YEARS, THE UNION OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA,

1857-1873, at

177 (1964).
28. Heintzman, The Spirit of Confederation- Professor Crgthton, Biculturalirn, and the Use of History, 52 CAN.
HIST. REV. 245, 249 (1971); see also Stanley, Act or Pact. Another Look at Confederation, 1956 REP. ANN.
MEETING CAN. HIST. A. 1.
29. The Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., ch. 3.
30. Act to amend and consolidate the Northwest Territories, 1875, 38 Vict., ch. 49.
31. See generally F. Sabetti, Covenant Language in Canada: Continuity and Change in Political Discourse 4-12 (1980) (Workshop on Covenant and Politics Working Paper No. 37, Temple University Center
for the Study of Federalism).
32. Wise, GodWs Peculiar Peoples, in THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: ASPECTS OF CANADA IN THE VIc'rORIAN AGE 36, 59 (W. Morton ed. 1968).
33. R. COOK, French Canada and Confederation. The Quest for Equality, in THE MAPLE LEAF FOREVER,
ESSAYS ON NATIONALISM AND POLITICS IN CANADA 68, 72 (1971).

34.

See generally A.

SIEGFRIED,

THE RACE

QUESTION IN

CANADA 19-105 (1906 & photo. reprint 1966).
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amendment. ' 35 The absence of an amending procedure was no problem as long as
Confederation worked as its creators intended.
For these reasons, Confederation did not appear at creation to be "the ambiguous bargain" it was later thought to be.3 6 Led by the prevailing conception of
political rule and biased toward hierarchical arrangements, Confederation Fathers
expected the 1867 constitutional settlement to work as it should.
II
THE

FIRST

PHASE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The rising dominance of provincial legislatures and parliament by disciplined
mass parties strengthened simple majority rule and legislative supremacy of the
executive. By the 1870's, federal and provincial autonomy joined with federal and
provincial supremacy to reveal critical shortcomings in the design of Confederation. Pressures for changing the 1867 constitutional settlement came from provincial governments and interests. In the absence of an amending formula, the
compact of provinces emerged as "the political formula" 3 7 for changing the 1867
constitution. The consequences of the compact of provinces for the Francophone
communities outside Quebec led, in turn, to other pressures for change, using "the
compact of peoples" as the moral and metaphysical foundations of Confederation.
A.

The Compact of Provinces

Judge T.J.J. Loranger in his Letters upon the Interpretationof the FederalConstitution
Known as the British North America Act 3 8 offered one of the most articulate and wellknown elaborations of the compact of provinces as the legal basis for constitutional
change. Loranger's contention was grounded on the fact that the central government was the creation of the provinces which existed before Confederation; they
were certainly not abolished by it. Hence, it followed that "[t]he Confederation of
the British Provinces was the result of a compact entered into by the provinces and
the Imperial Parliament, which in enacting the British North America Act, simply
' '39
ratified it.
The compact of provinces as the political formula for constitutional change has
continued to receive theoretical exposition among Francophone analysts and politicians.4° But it was the government of the Province of Ontario under Oliver
Mowat that, between 1872 and 1896, took the lead in giving practical expression
35.

J. MALLORY, THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT 24 (1971); see also P. GiRIN-LAJOIE,
33, 37-39 (1950).
36. See generally Mallory, Confederation The Ambiguous Bargain, J. CAN. STUD., July 1977, at 18.
37. G. MoscA, THE RULING CLASS 70 (H. Kahn trans. 1st ed. 1939). See also Sabetti, Mosca in Canadian .cialSence, in STUDIES ON THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF GAETANO MOSCA 165-80 (A. Albertoni ed.
1982).
38. T. LORANGER, LETTERS UPON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION KNOWN
AS THE BRmSH NORTH AMERICA ACT (1884).
39. Id at 61.
40. See, e.g., R. ARES, DOSSIER SUR LE PACTE FtDI-RATIF DE 1867, LA CONFEDERATION: PACTE OU
Loi? (1967); B. BISSONNETrE, ESsAI SUR LA CONSTITUTION DU CANADA (1963); G. REMILLARD, LE
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN CANADA

Ft-DtRALISME CANADIEN 26, 79-122, 165-66 (1980).
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plausible answers to several questions.
Why did Ontario, rather than another province, take
constitutional settlement? Why was Ontario's influence
paramount? As Armstrong suggests,
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provides a careful and
government and offers
the lead in altering the
in such remodelling so

Mowat recognized that the province occupied a unique place within the Canadian federation, owing to its size, its wealth, and its population. The poorer provinces might look upon
federalism as a means of overcoming regional disparities, but Ontario politicians have
always valued autonomy more than equality. The province wished to be left alone to
develop its bountiful resources, provided that national policies guaranteed it access to markets in other parts of the country. Leaders from Mowat onward, therefore, set out to extend
42
the sway of 'Empire Ontario' and in so doing increase their own power and authority.

The Interprovincial Conference of 1887-hailed by the attending provincial
premiers as a new 1864 Quebec conference 43 -suggests the point of convergence
between Ontario and the other provinces. Whereas all the other premiers,
including Quebec's Honor6 Mercier, sought economic assistance from the national
government, the Ontario premier sought autonomy, though in the interest of
maintaining a united provincial stand he went along with their requests for economic concessions."
What factors account for the pressures to remodel the 1867 constitution? First,
there was the propensity of provincial leaders to strengthen and increase their own
power and authority. In the case of Ontario, this struggle for provincial executive
supremacy focused on specific but also "universalistic" issues: 1) boundary disputes with Manitoba; 2) whether the lieutenant-governor was to continue to be a
sort of prefect of the national government in the province or whether he should be
simply the representative of the monarch in the province as the governor general
was in national affairs; 3) the control of patronage; 4) the exercise of the dominion
power of disallowance over the provincial laws that placed the provincial government under the tutelage of the federal government; and 5) the maintenance of
clearly defined, or "water-tight," dual sovereignty jurisdiction in several policy
areas over time. 45 This struggle for jurisdiction was fueled by two other factors:
the ability of businessmen to mobilize government for their own ends-propelling
the two levels of government into conflict with one another regardless of ties of
party solidarity, and the tendency of provincial bureaucrats to defend their sphere
of authority against what they saw as federal interference. 46 Ontario civil servants,
fearful that federal government might encroach upon their power to license, regulate, and monitor private companies, "enlisted in [their] battle both their political
superiors, who feared the loss of authority and revenues, and certain private interests who, for reasons of their own, preferred to come under [provincial] rather than
41. C. ARMSTRONG, supra note 24.
42. Id at 4.
43. R. COOK, PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY, MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE COMPACT THEORY, 1867-192 1,
at 41-42 (Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism No. 4, 1969).
44. Id ; see also C. ARMSTRONG, supra note 24, at 27-30.
45. See, e.g., C. ARMSTRONG, supra note 24, at 14-27.
46. Id at 85.
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Moreover, the decisions of the Judicial Committee of the

Privy Council in favor of provincial jurisdiction and Mowat's political skills and
canniness helped to raise the compact of provinces to a first principle of constitu48
tional choice.
The end of the Macdonaldian Constitution 49 was thus evident well before John
A. Macdonald died. French-Canadian Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier expressed
the prevailing view in 1907 when he said that "Confederation is a compact, made
originally by four provinces, but adhered to by the nine provinces who have
entered it, and I submit to the judgment of this House and to the best considera'50
By that
tion of its members, that this compact should not be lightly altered."
time "provincial rights and the compact theory [had] attained a position close to
motherhood in the scale of Canadian political values. It would be difficult to find
a prominent politician who was not willing to pay at least lip-service to the prin51
ciple of provincial rights and its theoretical underpinning, the compact theory."'
Two qualifications must be noted here. First, "[t]here was not the slightest
vestige of a 'compact' " in the Acts of Parliament that created the provinces of
Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905.52 Second, although Laurier agreed to hold a
federal-provincial conference in 1906, to discuss the revision of financial subsidies
to the provinces, other constitutional amendments involving the Senate and the
House of Commons continued to be made at the behest of the federal parliament
alone as late as 1916.53 And yet, the fact remains that as Canada emerged from
World War I "close to an independent state," 54 it became exceedingly difficult for
the federal government to ignore or disregard the constitutional demands of the
provinces. As Donald Creighton, a leading historian of Confederation, disparagingly characterized federal-provincial relations of that period:
The 1920's was a great era for the ventilation of provincial rights. Ontario reaffirmed the
Compact Theory of Confederation-the theory, that is, that any change in the British
North America Act requires the unanimous consent of the provinces. The west contributed
the doctrine that the beneficial control of natural resources is historically and constitutionally vested in the provinces-a doctrine which meant that the Dominion, having assumed
control of the lands of the western provinces, should now restore what remained of them
with compensation. The Maritimes, on their part, presented the thesis of Maritime Rights,
in which it was asserted that the Atlantic provinces had been induced to enter Confederation on the strength of certain representations and promises, which had never been fulfilled

47.

Id

48.

See the now classic article: Cairns, TheJudziial Committee and ItsCritics, 4 CAN. J. POL. Sci. 301

(1971).
49. See generally Morton, Confederation, 1870-1896. The End of the Macdonaldian Constitution and the Return
to Duali),, J. CAN. STUD., May 1966, at 11, reprinted in CANADIAN HISTORY SINCE CONFEDERATION,
ESSAYS AND INTERPRETATIONS 189 (B. Hodgins & R. Page eds. 1972).
50. Wilfrid Laurier, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN CANADA, 1900-1931, at 16 (R. Dawson ed.

1933).
51.

R. COOK, subra note 43, at 44.

52.
53.

A.
G.

LOWER, COLONY TO NATION,
STEVENSON,

A

HISTORY OF CANADA

UNFULFILLED UNION:

CANADIAN

432 (4th ed. rev. 1964).

FEDERALISM

AND NATIONAL

UNITY 210

(1979).
54. A. LOWER, supra note 52, at 474; see also 0. SKELTON, THE CANADIAN DOMINION, A CHRONICLE
OF OUR NORTHERN NEIGHBOR 271-74 (The Chronicles of America Vol. 49, 1919).
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and must now be55carried out. Broadly speaking, the Dominion surrendered its position in
all these matters.

At the Dominion-Provincial Conference of 1927, the sixtieth year of Confederation, the federal government, through Justice Minister Ernest Lapointe, formally
recognized and conceded that the provinces had to be consulted about the formula
56
for amending the BNA Act.
The compact of provinces as a political formula accomplished a veritable constitutional revolution in at least three ways. First, the provincial governments were
converted from glorified municipalities into coordinate sovereignties in matters of
public policy. Second, the provinces acquired the right to be consulted about, and
to share in the choice of, the formula for amending the BNA Act. Finally, and
most important for future constitutional changes, these transformations gave provincial governments and the federal government authority to determine or set
jointly constitutional and institutional arrangements for the provision of public
services-in effect, making the process of constitutional decisionmaking virtually
indistinguishable from that whereby intergovernmental policy is made in a federal
system.
B.

The Compact of Peoples

While the compact of provinces theory of Confederation emerged as an
attempt to provide legal support for checking and minimizing the federal government's tutelage over provincial governments and affairs, the compact of peoples
theory of Confederation emerged as an attempt to provide moral support for
checking and minimizing the consequences of the compact of provinces for the
Francophone communities outside Quebec-in essence, to sustain what Mr. Justice Berger of the Supreme Court of British Columbia has recently referred to as
"fragile freedoms. ' 57 The emergence of "provincial rights" gave rise to powerful
incentives for a strict application of provincial majority rule and "responsible government"-paralyzing both the BNA Act and the courts as instruments of juridical defense of minority rights. In such circumstances, neither the Monarchy nor
its representatives in Canada could act as they were intended to--as a check on the
ultimate power of elected politicians and provincial governments. As the settlement of the West transformed the delicate population balance of Canada, Arch55. Creighton, FederalRelations inCanada ince 1914, in CANADA IN PEACE AND WAR, EIGHT STUDIES
IN NATIONAL TRENDS SINCE 1914, at 29, 46-47 (C. Martin ed. 1941).
56. This is how the Report of Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1927, phrased it:
In order that adequate safeguard should be provided it was proposed that in the event that ordinary
amendments being contemplated the provincial legislature should be consulted, and a majority consent of the provinces obtained, while in the event of vital and fundamental amendments being sought
involving such questions as provincial rights, the rights of minorities, or rights generally affecting race,
language, and creed, the unanimous consent of the provinces should be obtained.
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES IN CANADA, 1900-1931, supra note 50, at 22. The report, i. at 23-24, also makes

clear that the Conference divided sharply on the proposal. Some provinces were entirely opposed to the
procedure, others either approved of the Minister of justice's proposal in its entirety or with minor modifications. Although the Dominion government under Mackenzie King decided, as a result, to let the matter
drop, the principle that provinces were entitled to be consulted about the formula for amending the BNA
remained. See also P. GLRIN-LAJOIE, supra note 35, at 228-30.
57.

T. BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN CANADA (1981).
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bishop Tache, the ecclesiastical and national leader of the French Canadians in
Manitoba, foresaw the outcome: "Number is going to make us weak, . . . and
since under our constitutionalsystem number is power, we are going to find ourselves at
the mercy of those who do not love us." 58
Beginning in New Brunswick in the 1870's, in Manitoba in the 1880's, then in
the newly created provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan in 1905, and finally in
Ontario in 1912 and Eastern Canada as a whole by 1920, the linguistic and educational rights of the various French Catholic communities were challenged by
responsible government, with relative immunity. 5 9 In an effort to minimize or prevent this tyranny of the majority or privileged minority, Francophone lay and
religious leaders turned to the compact of peoples as the implied moral and metaphysical base of Confederation.
Henri Bourassa, a Catholic thinker and founder of the influential Montreal
newspaper Le Devoir, emerged as the most eloquent user of this political formula as
a means to insure the survival of Canadian duality. 60 He frequently asserted that
mutual respect was "the only ground upon which it is possible for us to meet so as
to work out our national problems. There are here neither masters nor valets;
there are neither conquerors nor conquered ones; there are two partners whose
partnership was entered into upon fair and well-defined lines."'6 1 He averred that
the making of Canada in 1867 represented, in the final analysis, "the free and
voluntary association of two peoples, enjoying equal rights in all matters. ' 62 Bourassa warned that "[i]f the Canadian constitution is to last, if the Canadian Confederation is to be maintained, the narrow attitude towards minorities which
increasingly manifests itself in the English provinces must disappear, and we must
return to the original spirit of the alliance. ' 63 The original spirit of Confederation
.was, for the founder of Le Devoir, best exemplified by what was taking place in
Quebec:
The vast majority of its people speak French, but they grant to the English-speaking
minority the right to speak English freely, and they accord them in the local administrations, municipal or provincial, those facilities which we ask in federal affairs, not merely as
a matter of right-I would never put the question on that narrow basis-but as a matter of

58. R. COOK, CANADA AND THE FRENCH-CANADIAN QUESTION 183 (1966) (emphasis added); see also
R. BROWN & R. COOK, CANADA 1896-1921, A NATION TRANSFORMED 2-5, 60-73 (1974); Cook, The Paradox of QOebec, in ENTERING THE EIGHTIES: CANADA IN CRISIS 49-51 (R. Carty & W. Wards eds. 1981).
59. Seegenerally T. BERGER,Supra note 57, at 19-21, 26-89; R. BROWN & R. COOK, supra note 58, at 1218, 75-78; L. CLARK, THE MANITOBA SCHOOL QUESTION: MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY RIGHTS?
(1968); R. COOK, THE POLITICS OF JOHN W. DAFOE AND THE FREE PRESS 69-70 (1963); A. LOWER, supra
note 52, at 399-402, 421; W. MORTON, THE KINGDOM OF CANADA 371-72, 380-81, 432-35 (1963); W.
MORTON, supra note 27, at 259, 269; Staples, Consociationalismat Provtwial Level. The Erosion of Dualism in
Manitoba, 1870-1890, in CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN SEGMENTED
SOCIETIES 288 (K. McRae ed. 1974); M. WADE, THE FRENCH CANADLNS 1760-1967, at 433-40, 537-45
(rev. ed. 1975).
60. The following works provide a helpful introduction to Bourassa's thought and action: Davenport,
Nationalismand Conciliation: The Bourassa-HertzogPosture, 44 CAN. HIST. REV. 193 (1963); Laurendeau, Henn
Bourassa, in OUR LIVING TRADITION, FOURTH SERIES 135-58 (R. McDougall ed. 1962); Levitt, Henri Bourassa and Modern IndustrialSociety, 50 CAN. HisT. REV. 37-50 (1969); O'Connell, The Ideas of Henri Bourassa,
19 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. Si.361 (1953); 2 M. WADE, supra note 59, at 617-65.
61. R. COOK, supra note 58, at 107.
62. Id at 51.
63. 2 M. WADE, supra note 59, at 618.
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common sense, and true Canadian spirit, so as to spread out into every province of Canada
citizenship which exists in Quebec, and should exist everywhere
the same spirit of Canadian
64
in the Dominion.

The history of Quebec is not free of ethnic prejudice, nativistic discrimination, and
religious intolerance-at times even against non-French Catholics. But this history does not greatly undermine Bourassa's compact of peoples. As Andr6
Laurendeau, a committed Quebec nationalist and co-chairman of the Royal Commission on Bilinguilism and Biculturalism of the 1960's, noted, "Bourassa
defended the rights of his own. . .[,the] French Canadians; but he always chose
65
to do so in terms that were valid for all."
Bourassa's appeal to an implied covenantal base of Confederation was not
heeded, however. Protestant and English Canadians, well familiar with covenantal thought, failed to extend that tradition to French Canadians. As Ramsay
Cook explained in ProvincialAutonomy, Mnonty Rights and the Compact Theory, 18671921,66 Bourassa's compact of peoples formula for constitutional choice
had on its side none of the powerful influences which had played so large a part in gaining
wide acceptace for the theory of the compact of provinces. No political party adopted it as
part of its platform. . . .Nor did the theory win the whole-hearted approval of powerful
provincial governments; indeed to the extent that it implied a limitation on provincial
powers, it went against the views of most of the provinces. Not even the province of Quebec
... adopted the theory in any consistent fashion. Finally, the compact of [peoples], unlike
the theory of the compact of provinces, won no support from the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council .... In light of these observations, it is not surprising that the concept of
the cultural6 7compact of Confederation remained the possession of only a small minority of
Canadians.

What became known as "the Anglo-Saxon Kulturkampf" followed, sweeping
away French-language rights outside Quebec64-in effect, lending credence to de
Tocqueville's observation that "the extension of judicial power in the political
world ought. . . to be in the exact ratio of the extension of elective power. If these
two institutions do not go hand-in-hand, the state must fall into anarchy or into
69
servitude."
It has been suggested that French Canadians then had "the proof that the
English Canadians-at least a noisy and powerful group among them--did not
accept French Canada as an equal partner."' 70 Yet, at least until World War II,
most French-Canadian nationalists clung to the hope that some day they would
receive equitable treatment outside Quebec. 7 1 It is fair to recall another item of
"proof:" Quebec's failure to adopt the compact of peoples in any consistent
fashion gave English Canadians "proof" that the Quebec governing class was like
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Quoted in R. COOK, supra note 58, at 39.
Laurendeau, supra note 60, at 135, 145.
R. COOK, supra note 43.
Id at 63.
See supra note 59.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 77 (P. Bradley ed. New York 1954)(1st ed. Paris

1835).
70. Brunet, The French Canadrans'Searchfor a Fatherland,in NATIONALISM IN CANADA 47, 55 (P. Russell
ed. 1966).

71.

See ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON CONSTITrrTIONAL PROBLEMS, THE TREMBLAY REPORT

(D. Kwavnick ed. 1973).
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that of all other provinces. 72 Against this backdrop of Confederation transformed,
the second phase of constitutional change occurred.
III
THE SECOND PHASE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The "agreement" reached at the 1927 federal-provincial conference 73 ended
the first phase of constitutional change. But it also virtually insured that no area
of public economy could not henceforth be potentially subject to "federal-provincial diplomacy"7 4 and be dealt with on the basis of unanimous consent. As a
result, the search for an amending formula for the constitution that could at the
same time appropriately locate and fix "power somewhere" 75 in the face of changing public economies and changing political contingencies proved to be exceedingly difficult and costly in time and effort.
A.

Attempts to Amend the Constitution

The 1927 federal-provincial conference was followed by others in 1931, 1933,
1934, 1935, 1936, 1941, 1945, 1950, 1955, and 1957, to reach an unprecedented
number, activity, and scope in the 1960's and 1970's. The "category" approach to
constitutional amendments adopted in 192776 was refined in the 1935-36 negotiations. Constitutional provisions were divided into four categories: 1) those
affecting the Dominion alone would be amended by Parliament; 2) those affecting
the Dominion and some but not all the provinces would be amended by the consent of the parties involved; 3) those affecting fundamental rights such as civil law
in Quebec and linguistic and educational provisions would require the unanimous
consent of Parliament and all the provincial legislatures; and 4) all other matters
would need the approval of six of the nine provinces, and those six must contain
fifty-five percent of the total population. 77 This category approach became the
basis of all subsequent federal-provicial negotiations and was further refined
between 1960 and 1966 by what became known as the Fulton-Favreau Formula.78
72.
73.

See generally G. GLAZEBROOK, A
See supra note 56.

74.

See generally R. SIMEON, FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL DIPLOMACY:

HISTORY OF CANADIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT

328 (1966).

THE MAKING OF RECENT POLICY

(1972).
75. For evidence of this tradition of thought and action among students and practitioners of Canadian politics see, e.g., Cairns,Altematie Styles in the Study of Canadian Politics, 7 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 101 (1974);
Sproule-Jones, An Analysis of Canadian Federalism, PUBLIUS 110-13 (1974); Sabetti, Reftctions on Canadian
Urban Governance Research, 8 COMP. URB. RESEARCH 87-112 (1981).
76. The standard account for this history is P. GARIN-LAJoIE, supra note 35, at 234-49; see also C.
IN CANADA

ARMSTRONG, supra note 24, at 199-206.
77. C. ARMSTRONG, supra note 24, at 205-06.

78. The post-World War 11 search for an amending formula that culminated in the Fulton-Favreau
Formula is aptly traced in J. MALLORY, THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT 379-86 (1971).
Mallory described the Fulton-Favreau Formula in the following terms: the formula "dealt with the
problem of section 91(1) of the BNA Act (the 1949 amending formula) by revising it and incorporating it,
together with a revised form of the provincial amending power in section 92(1), into the proposed
amending procedure. The power of Parliament to amend the constitution was more specifically defined as
applying to 'the Constitution of Canada in relation to the executive Government of Canada and the
Senate and the House of Commons.' " Id. at 384. Some additions were also inserted to protect provincial
representation in the Senate and in the House of Commons.
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The category approach failed to reform the constitution but it did produce ad
hoc financial arrangements for unemployment and relief in the Depression 79 and,
by 1940, a national unemployment insurance plan.8 0 After the war, the same
approach served to introduce considerable flexibility and adjustment in intergovernmental relations concerned with the provision of public services.,8 The earlier
ad hoc arrangements for employment and relief grew into conditional and unconditional grants to provinces. This federal spending, together with the delegation of
federal powers to provincial agencies and the creation of ad hoc or standing intergovernmental committees, created the basis of what, particularly under the
Pearson government, became known as "cooperative federalism. ' '8 2 This cooperative federalism overshadowed the constitutional impasse but made it more difficult
to overcome, because the federal government, in its desire to accommodate the
Quebec government under Jean Lasage, acted as if almost everything was negotiable-even what seemed, to some, essential to the effective functioning of Canadian federalism. Little wonder, then, that by the time the centennial of
Confederation approached there was in many quarters considerable skepticism
about the very credentials of Canadian constitutional arrangements. As one
observer noted, "By . . . 1966, the Canadian federal system had reached one of
'
the most severe crises in its history. "83
The failure of the piecemeal approach to constitutional change led in the late
1960's to a more comprehensive approach under the new Liberal and more centralist Prime Minister, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, whose task was in turn made easier
by successive changes in the Quebec premiership after Lesage-Daniel Johnson,
Jean-Jacques Bertrand, and Robert Bourassa. This approach involved the
entrenchment of official language rights, a bill of rights, and equalization payments to provinces. This comprehensive approach helped to produce what
became known as the Victoria Charter Formula between 1968 and 1971.84 But its
very comprehensiveness could not obscure the fact that it ignored or glossed over
division of power questions so crucial to Quebec. As the then Quebec Deputy
Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs later explained Quebec's veto: "The charter
completely missed the real Canadian problem, that of the place of Quebec and the
Quebec nation in Canada. What is more, Quebec's acceptance would have

80.

C. ARMSTRONG, supra note
Id. at 209-12, 219-20.

81.

Eg., D. SMILEY, CONSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION AND CANADIAN FEDERALISM SINCE 1945 (1970).

79.

24, at 148-59.

82. Cooperative federalism is defined in the Canadian context as a series of pragmatic and piecemeal
responses by the federal and provincial governments to the provision of public services involving mutual
interdependence. See generally D. SMILEY, supra note 81, at 111-28.
83. D. SMILEY, THE CANADIAN POLITICAL NATIONALITY 84 (1967).
84. In addition to the points mentioned in the text, the Victoria Charter had a procedure whereby the
most important parts of the Canadian Constitution could be amended by resolution of the Senate and
House of Commons and of at least a majority of the provinces which included: (1)each province with a
population of at least 25% of the population of Canada (in effect, Ontario and Quebec); (2) at least two of
the Atlantic provinces; and (3) at least two of the western provinces having together at least half of the
population of all western provinces. In brief, the procedure of the Victoria Charter diverged from both
existing practice and the Fulton-Favreau Formula by not requiring unanimous provincial consent for
inportant amendments.
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amounted to a denial of the problem's very existence."8' 5 Thus the Victoria
Charter failed to receive the needed consensus to make it operational, closing yet
another round of constitutional negotiations.
The end of the Trudeau minority government in 1974 was accompanied by
renewed intergovernmental efforts to patriate and amend the BNA Act, lasting
until the very end of the 1970's. But the flurry of activities that accompanied the
accession to power of the independenliste Parti-Qu6b6cois in 1976,86 the rise of the
"New West" in Alberta, 7 the success of the Progressive Conservative party defeat
of the Liberal party in the 1979 federal elections, and the return to power of the
Liberal party under Trudeau in the January 1980 federal elections 8 could neither
lessen nor overcome the constitutional stalemate. Conjectures that Canada would
be entering the eighties in crisis8 9 did not seem too inappropriate or exaggerated.
Thus the second phase of constitutional change was plagued by insurmountable difficulties in amending and patriating the constitution and by intergovernmental instability in the provision of public services. Little purpose will be served
here by tracing adplenum the tangled federal-provincial diplomacy that shaped
and accompanied constitutional negotiations and intergovernmental relations
between 1927 and 1980 and the many-colored reports of government commissions,
task forces, and political parties that the not-so-successful federal-provincial diplomacy generated.90 Instead, the answers to the following set of questions will be
attempted: Why did the great quantity of energy devoted to constitutional decisionmaking over the course of about fifty years produce minimal results? What
factors account for the difficulties and deadlocks in constitutional negotiations?
What reasons best explain the instability of intergovernmental arrangements for
the provision of public services?
B.

Sources of Instability and Stalemate
Several plausible factors causing the deadlock in constitutional negotiations

85. C. MORIN, QUEBEC VERSUS OTTAWA: THE STRUGGLE FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT 1960-72, at 69
(1976). See also E. MCWHINNEY, QUEBEC AND THE CONSTrrIUTION 1960-1978, at 24-26 (1979).
86. As the independentist Quebec government began preparations for how Quebec could peacefully
become a sovereign nation-state, in association with or independent from Canada, the Trudeau government in 1977 established a Task Force on Canadian Unity headed by a former Liberal federal cabinet
minister from Quebec and a former premier of Ontario, while the Quebec provincial liberals eventually
chose Claude Ryan, a much respected and highly regarded editor for Le Devot, to lead them and, in effect,

to thwart separatist designs. Academicians also joined in these events by providing analyses and proposals
such as those in MUST CANADA FAIL? (R. Simeon ed. 1977).
87. See generally Pratt, The State and Province-Buildng. Alberta's Development Strategy, in THE CANADIAN
STATE: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND POLITICAL POWER 133-64 (L. Panitch ed. 1977).
88.
See generally CANADA AT THE POLLS, 1979 AND 1980, A STUDY OF THE GENERAL ELECTIONS (H.

Penniman ed. 1981).
89.

See ENTERING THE EIGHTIES: CANADA IN CRISIS (R. Carty & W. Wards eds. 1981).
In addition to R. SIMEON, supra note 74, see also TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY, A FUTURE
TOGETHER (3 vols. 1979); blue colored GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC, QUEBEC--CANADA: A NEW DEAL:

90.

THE QUEBEC GOVERNMENT

PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN

EQUALS: SOVEREIGNTY

ASSOCIATION (1979); Smiley, The Association Dimension of Sovereignty-Association: A Response to the
Quebec White Paper (Discussion Paper No. 8 of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's
University, Kingston, Ontario, 1980); and CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE QUEBEC LIBERAL
PARTY, A NEW CANADIAN FEDERATION (1980).
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loom large. These factors can be divided into two interrelated but analytically
distinct categories: extrinsic reasons which are outside of constitutional arrangements proper, and intrinsic reasons which are due to defects or shortcomings in
constitutional arrangements themselves. The principal extrinsic factors were identified by the Task Force on Canadian Unity with the following statement and
prognostication: "Duality and regionalism lie at the heart of the Confederation
crisis [and] . . . any general reform effort, however well intended, which fails to
enhance duality or which offends the principle of regionalism is unlikely to
increase harmony and unity in Canada." 9 1 The principal intrinsic factor was suggested by Mark Sproule-Jones's question: "What consequences are likely to ensue
when constitutional arrangements are jointly determined by an exclusive group of
eleven governments, governments that individually act as 'teams' . . . ?92 Each
of these three factors is considered below.
1. CanadianDuality. Canadian duality is a summary phrase which stands for
mutually proper, fair, and just political relationships between English-speaking
and French-speaking Canadians. The Anglo-Saxon Kulturkampf against the
French and the rejection of the compact of peoples during the first phase of constitutional change seriously undermined Canadian duality, with little threat to the
territorial integrity of Canada. But the French Kulturkampf for survival since then
has posed and continues to pose a serious threat to the territorial integrity of
Canada.
It has often been asserted that "[t]he refusal of the majority in English-speaking
Canada to uphold the linguistic rights and therefore the cultural integrity of the
minority led that minority to assert that it should have, indisputably and where it
could exercise it, the political power necessary to insure its survival. If [Georges
Etienne] Cartier became [Henri] Bourassa, Bourassa, owing in part to the fate of
the bicultural idea in English Canada, became Michel Brunet. ' '93 The identification by French Canadian nationalists of their country with the province of Quebec
alone contributed, no doubt, to what Michel Brunet (a Quebec nationalist historian) called the end of the French Canadians' long search for a fatherland. 94 But
the end of this long search was empirically grounded and manifested in the social,
economic, and political transformations that reached unprecedented levels with
the end of the Duplessis regime in 1959. 95
The societal transformations were encouraged, sustained, and given purpose by
the bureaucratic and political imperatives of provincial state building and
omnicompetence. 96 These transformations not only led to a new "language ques91. 1 TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY, A FUTURE TOGETHER 36 (1979).
92. Sproule-Jones, supra note 75, at 109, 123; see also Sproule-Jones, Public Choice and Federalism in
Australia and Canada (Canberra Center for Research on Federal Financial Relations Research Monograph No. 11, 1975)
93. Smith, Metaphor and Nationality in North Amen'a, 51 CAN. HIST. REV. 247, 269 (1970).
94. Brunet, supra note 70, at 60.
95. Eg., C. BLACK, DuPLSSIS (1977); K. McROBERTS & D. POSGATE, QUEBEC: SOCIAL CHANGE
AND POLITICAL CRISIS (1976).
96. Bolduc & Gow, Environment and Administration." Quebec, 1867-1980, in THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
IN CANADA 31, 46-56 (0. Dwivedi ed. 1982); see also K. McROBERTS & D. POSGATE, supra note 95, at 96129.
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tion" in Quebec itself that revealed fully the precarious freedoms of access to equal
97
public services enjoyed by Canadians of non-French and non-English origin.
9
But they also created an almost unprecedented case for "Quebec versus Ottawa" 8
that neither the federal nor the other provincial ruling classes of Canada could
ignore or deny without danger. In the course of the 1960's and 1970's, there thus
developed a situation whereby, as the ten governments tried to accommodate
Quebec's struggle for jurisdiction in several policy areas, the Quebec government,
under different parties and leaders, came to view the very patriation and reform of
the Canadian Constitution as potential checks on Quebec's own "unfinished
revolution." 99 The decisional rules that applied to federal-provincial negotiations
ultimately served to insure that the Fulton-Favreau and the Victoria Charter formulae would remain just that. The defeat of the Parti Qu~bcois Proposal of a
sovereignty-association between Quebec and Canada in the 1980 May referendum
could neither remove Canadian duality from question nor finish "Quebec's unfinished revolution."
2. Reg'onahsm. It is generally recognized that regionalism was and has been
one of the most consistent and hardy factors for "limited identities" ° in Canada
since Confederation. Although the roots and strength of regionalism are difficult
to measure and although regional interests may not be the same as provincial government interests, 10 1 provincial governments have historically been important
agencies for regional movements, demands, and protests.
As we have already seen, the compact of provinces was used as a political
formula to justify and effect a veritable revolution in federal-provincial relations.
As a consequence, even the Depression failed to persuade many provincial leaders
that the problem of the modern, industrial state could be met only through the
centralization of power in Ottawa. 10 2 More recently, interprovincial conferences
have become important forums for interprovincial bargaining and for developing
joint positions to take to Ottawa. 0 3 The growth of what has been called "prairie
capitalism"' 1 4 is one of the most powerful expressions of regionalism since World
War II. The defeat of the Social Credit government of Alberta in 1971 by the
Progressive Conservative Party brought to an end a long period of government
conservatism and began a new era of "interventionist, 'positive' government . . .
employed to nurture the development, and to defend the province-building interests, of an ascendant class of indigenous business entrepreneurs, urban profes97. Some of the consequences of the French-language legislation (Bills 22 and 101) are traced and
discussed throughout S. ARNOPOULOS & D. CLIFr, THE ENGLISH FACT IN QUEBEC (1980).
See generally C. MORIN, supra note 85.
Stegeneraly L. DION, QUEBEC: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (T. Romer trans. 1976); see also
the article by Daniel Latouche in this issue of LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
98.
99.

Careless, "Limnited Identities" in Canada, 50 CAN. HIST. REV. 1 (1969).
101. Simeon, Intergovernmental Relations and the Challenges to Canadian Federalism, 23 CAN. PUB. AD. 14, 26
(1980).
102. See generally J. MALLORY, SOCIAL CREDIT AND THE FEDERAL POWER IN CANADA (1st ed. 1954).
103. See Leach, InterprovniaalCo-operaton. Neglected Aspect of Canadian Federalism, 2 CAN. PUB. AD. 83
(1959); Simeon, supra note 101, at 21.
104. See J. RICHARDS & L. PRATr, PRAIRIE CAPITALISM: POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE NEW
WEST (1979).

100.
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sionals, and state adminstrators." 10 5 As a result, the post-Victoria rounds of
federal-provincial negotiations were characterized by a considerable struggle for
jurisdiction over culture, communications, and the federal spending power, as well
as natural resources. Alberta and Quebec were not the only provinces to engage in
this struggle for jurisdiction with Ottawa. 106
The growth of regionalism necessarily implied an increasing interdependence
and sharing of responsibilities with the federal government. But federal-provincial
negotiations were structured so as to hinder rather than facilitate federal-provincial interdependence and partnership.
3. Constitutional Arrangements as Executive-Determined Faci'littes. Standard
accounts of Canadian federal-provincial instability and constitutional stalemate
start with the assumption that constitutional arrangements are as a rule set jointly
by the executive-dominated governments acting individually as constitutional
decisionmakers. As the writings of Alan Cairns 10 7 indicate, the shortcoming in this
approach is to take as given what should be taken as problematic. The chief value
of Sproule-Jones's analysis of Canadian federalism' 08 consists in reversing the order
by considering what consequences are likely to ensue when constitutional arrangements are jointly determined by an exclusive group of eleven governments
requiring unanimous consent.
First, the provincial and federal governments of Canada resisted all attempts to
include other public or private persons from sharing in the setting up of constitutional arrangements. Exclusion was rigidly maintained. The controversy surrounding the Statute of Westminster 1° 9 in 1930-1931 is a case in point. By
removing all constitutional limitations on the sovereignty of the British Dominions, the Statute of Westminster appeared, in effect, to transfer the power to
amend the BNA Act from the British Parliament to the parliament of Canada
without necessarily the consent of provincial legislators. Provincial governments
successfully pressured the national government to secure a clause in the Statute of
Westminster exempting the BNA Act from the effect of the Statute and thereby
maintaining their role as agents of constitutional choice."l 0 Another example is
furnished by the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, the
Rowell-Sirois Commission, mandated by the federal government in 1937 to
examine the economic and financial basis of Confederation, the distribution of
legislative responsibility, and the financial relations between governments. 1 For
their centralist bias on many policy issues, members of the commission were hailed
in some quarters as "the new Fathers of Confederation"' 1 2 but this view was stren105.

Pratt, supra note 87, at 133.

106.

See J. MEEKINSON, CANADIAN FEDERALISM: MYTH OR REALITY 140-87, 280-365 (3d ed. 1977).
See Cairns, The Other Crisis of CanadianFederalism, 22 CAN. PUB. AD. 175-95 (1979); Cairns, The

107.
Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism, 10 CAN. J. POL Sci. 695-726 (1977).
108. See M. SPROULE-JONES, supra note 92; Sproule-Jones, supra note 75, at 109.
109. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, ch. 4.
110. See C. ARMSTRONG, upra note 24, at 146-48.
111. THE ROWELL-SIROIs REPORT, THE CARLETON LIBRARY No. 5 (D. Smiley ed. 1963) (an abridgment of Book I of the Royal Commission Report on Dominion-Provincial Relations, 1940).
112. See, e.g., Creighton, supra note 55, at 56. See also Alway, Hepburn, King, and the Rowell-Sirois Commission, 48 CAN. HisT. REV. 113 (1967). Smiley, The Rowell-Sirois Report, ProvincialAutonomy, and Post-War
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uously opposed in words and deeds by several provincial premiers. More recently,
attempts to entrench a bill or charter of human rights by Prime Minister Diefenbaker in the late fifties and by Trudeau in the late sixties and seventies failed to
secure unanimous consent because such charters transferred, or appeared to
3
transfer, a substantial amount of authority from the legislatures to the courts."
A second consequence of the joint supply of constitutional arrangements by the
exclusive club of eleven governments was put in this way by one observer:
"[R]edrafting [the constitution] is hard enough in Canada. It becomes immensely
more complicated when too many people want to use the occasion to solve all the
country's political problems at the same time-as well as design new rules for
determining the framework for tackling these very problems." 1 4 Several other
consequences occurred when the governments attempted formal or tacit coordinated behavior. Each government had an incentive to be the sole supplier (i.e.,
exclude each other from the provision) of public services within its jurisdiction,
while enlisting the other governments in sharing the costs of programs. At the
same time, each government had an incentive to prevent another from raiding its
treasury to provide services that are nonconsumable within its own jurisdiction.
As a result, each government had to ensure that new or extended programs undertaken by other governments met with its own willing consent. There must either
have been unanimous approval or no coordinated action was viable.'" 5
Sproule-Jones noted three other consequences that flowed from the logic
requiring unanimous consent for federal-provincial initiatives. As the history of
the different patriation formulae between 1935 and 1979 suggests, one consequence of unanimous consent was to grant any holdout extraordinary bargaining
power." 6 As a condition of giving its consent, any holdout government was able
to demand a much larger than proportionate share of its payoffs from the group
activity. Quebec has not been the only government to engage in frequent holdout
tactics," 17 although its reasons differ from those of the other provinces. The result
in the post-World War II period was a series of complex and evolving fiscal
arrangements and equalization schemes, as well as the establishment of the "welfare-state"-whose eventual modifications, subject as they were to other rounds of
bargaining costs, plus any side payments to take account of holdout strategies of
one or more governments, carried with them their own source of instability.',,
Another consequence was the prevalence of logrolling.11 9 Governments were
willing to give consent on certain matters strongly preferred by other governments,
in exchange for their support on matters which the first government preferred
CanadianFederalism, 28 CAN. J. ECON. POL. SCI. 54 (1962), notes correctly that "[i]n spite of the scope and
quality of the commission's work, its analysis of federal-provincial relations has had surprisingly little influence on the direction that the theory and practice of Canadian federalism have taken since 1945."
113. Sproule-Jones, supra note 75, at 124. See Laskin, An Inquity into the Diifenbaker Bill of Rights, 37
CAN. B. REV. 77 (1959).
114. Black, Federal-ProvinaclConferences and Constitutional Change, 78 QUEEN'S Q. 298, 298 (1971).
115. Sproule-Jones, supra note 75, at 124-25.
116. Id at 125.
117. Id See also C. MORIN, supra note 85, at 69 and E. McWHINNEY, supra note 85, at 24-26.
118. Sproule-Jones, supra note 75, at 125, and nn. 54, 55 & 56 cited therein.
119. Id at 126.
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intensely. The Canada Pension Plan of 1966 and the different opting-out proce20
dures were some of the most evident results.
The final consequence of the unanimous consent procedure is the bargaining
costs in time and effort that each government was forced to bear over the course of
fifty or more years.' 2 ' The institutionalized machinery of federal-provincial relations become more and more complicated by the 1960's.122 Formal meetings, conferences, and committee meetings among civil servants and occasionally ministers
of the eleven governments became frequent occurrences-increasing the bargaining costs. Sproule-Jones suggested that another reason for the increase in bargaining costs Was that each government had an incentive to monitor the
operations and initiatives of the other governments, for fear of being left out from
future deliberations.12 3 The growth of provincial intergovernmental relations ministries was, no doubt, partly due to this. The outcome was an increased size of the
bargaining costs encountered by each government as time progressed.
As a result, the joint supply of constitutional arrangements by the exclusive
groups of governments led to the rigid exclusion of other individuals or collective
bodies from sharing in the setting of constitutional arrangements. It led to a
variety of ways in which public goods and services were delivered and amending
formulae conceptualized. The post-fifties period was characterized by an unequaled level of federal-provincial negotiations and relations. But the dictates of
federal and provincial bargaining, together with the pressures of Quebec nationalism and regionalism more generally, insured that none of the ways in which
collective services were delivered and constitutional changes proposed would
remain stable or secure for too long. Minimal results in constitutional reform and
inherent instability in intergovernmental relations have been the signal features of
some fifty years of attempted constitutional change in Canada.
IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THIRD PHASE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The making of Canada was one of the most notable achievements in the nineteenth century. Unlike some other countries, Canada was established by peaceful
means within an international bmperwn. A new political economy experiment was
created by fusing together two seemingly antithetical principles of organization:
federalism and responsible government. The novelty of this experiment attracted
the attention of an Italian publicist, Enea Cavalieri, 124 who in 1876 travelled
throughout most of what was then Canada to see how the new social, economic,
and political order worked. He remarked in his travel notes that all the reading he
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Enea Cavalieri is perhaps best known for the work he did with L. Franchetti and Sidney Sonnino
on Sicilian rural conditions in 1876. In fact he left Sicily to visit Canada and the United States. His book
on North America is entitled IN GIRO DEL MONDO: OSSERVAZIONI ED APPuNTI (1880) and is divided into
two parts: Part I, consisting of 17 chapters, deals with Canada; Part II, consisting of 20 chapters, deals with
the United States.
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had done on North America had not prepared him for what he found: a union of
various colonies and peoples in a single and great Dominion. Europe paid little
attention to this new country, but, suggested Cavalieri, its constitutional development, public economy, and law were worth knowing and studying. Canadian Confederation signalled the beginning of a new political economy equilibrium in
North America and presaged the possibility of novel solutions to contemporary
12 5
problems in Europe.
Flaws in its original creation made Canada highly unstable in some important
respects. Yet, the flaws that made Confederation highly unstable also served to
insure its very existence. Such was the view of Andrew Pattullo, an Ontario journalist and legislator, as he praised Mowat's leadership in pressing for constitutional
change between 1872 and 1896.126 Contemporary historians of Canadian federalism tend to side with Pattullo. They suggest that previous generations of historians and political scientists have dealt too harshly with the compact of
provinces theory of Confederation and with premiers such as Ontario's Mitchell
Hepburn. 127 But, as we have hinted in the discussion of the compact of peoples
and the second phase of constitutional change, the benefits from the first phase of
constitutional change are not easy to reckon.
, Trudeau's last attempt to patriate and amend the BNA Act succeeded in overcoming the stalemate, in part because it began unilaterally and in part because it
was achieved without unanimous consent (Quebec dissenting). To be sure, there
had been threats of unilateral action before by Trudeau and other prime ministers.
What factors account for Trudeau's urgency to press ahead? Why did he succeed
when all others failed? 128 No doubt, these are features of the Trudeau partriation
package that will receive considerable scholarly attention in the future-as they
should. But other features of Trudeau's patriation package appear equally worthy
of study.
The proclamation of the Canadian Constitution of 1982 ends a long phase of
crisis, stalemate, and minimal results and begins a phase of constitutional decisionmaking that seems to bear little relationship to the past. What implications, if
any, do the previous phases of constitutional change have for the new one?
Canadian dualism or the place of Quebec in Confederation will continue to tax
the new constitutional arrangements as will the forces of regionalism or provincial
state building. More fundamentally, as long as federal and provincial executives
continue to jointly determine constitutional arrangements, and as long as the
present practice of parliamentary government continues, the third phase of constitutional change will be characterized by considerable institutional weakness and
failure. Robin W. Boadway and Kenneth H. Norrie in their recent analysis of
"Constitutional Reform Canadian-Style" warned of somewhat similar
consequences:
125. Id. at 196-97.
126. See C. ARMSTRONG, sapra note 24, at 32.
127. Id Se also Mallory, Style andFashwr A Note on Alternative Styles in CanadtanPohttalSetewe, 7 CAN.
J. POL. 129 (1974).
128. D. SMILEY, CANADA IN QUESTION: FEDERALISM IN THE EIGHTIES 88 (3d ed. 1980).
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[Bly turning the task over to the first ministers we are necessarily severely restricting the kind
of constitutional change we might expect. We are guaranteeing that the process will be one
of strategic bargaining by eleven self-interested participants. There will be no opportunity
to present and discuss alternative constitutional arrangements that might more effectively
provide public goods to the population. This is especially true of proposals that would
significantly alter the authority of both existing levels of government. Not only does the
process itself preclude other options, however, but it also seems slated to deliver us a result
129
that might actually be undesirable.

The Charter in the 1982 Constitution may, however, open up the process of participation in constitutional change through citizen litigation which may, in turn,
enhance the role of the courts in conflict management. 30 This means that the
Charter could become an important source of instability and crisis for "parliamentary majoritarian democracy" l/a McRuer Report' 3' in, and outside of, Ontario.
There is no interest in straitjacketing, albeit if only with the power of words,
Canadian constitutional development. As Milovan Djilas has observed, "History
does not exactly abound with instances of thinkers' predictions having come true,
least of all those relating to social patterns and people's attitudes and ways of
life."' 3 2 The adaptive potential of the Canadian people encourages "a bias for
hope." 33 And yet, the preceding analysis suggests that there is little or no prospect
for changing the executive-centered system of government in Canada. At the same
time, knowledge of the basic rules that are applicable to the governance of Canadian society may be lost as people become spectators of federal-provincial conflict
and state pageantry. A situation may develop whereby as Canadians become
34
increasingly prone to speak the language of doubt when describing their society,'
they will be unable to conceptualize political solutions appropriate to their exigencies. But, it is precisely here that political scientists can make a contribution.
Their task is not to tend to the system, but rather to assess its performance.' 35 For
this reason there is much to learn or unlearn from the study of the historical context of the Constitution of 1982. A new understanding of Canadian Federalism is
needed before contemporary problems can be resolved.

129. R. Boadway & K. Norrie, Constitutional Reform Canadian-Style: An Economic Perspective, 6 CAN. PUB.
POL'Y 492, 494 (1980).
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Summer 1981, at 231. See also T. BERGER, supra note 57, at 258, 260-262.
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CAN. STUD., July 1970, at 3.
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